Byzantine errors are considered the most common and difficult class of errors among error modes. The Fail-Stop-Fail mode takes the simplest end of the spectrum. While fail-stop error mode simply means that the only way to reach the defect is a node crash detected by other nodes, Byzantine errors do not involve constraints, meaning that the undone node can generate any data, including data that make it appear as a functional node. Thus, Byzantine errors can confuse error detection systems, making the margin of error more difficult. Despite the analogy, a Byzantine failure is not necessarily a security problem with hostile human interventions: it can be the result of electrical or software errors. The Byzantine margin of error can be reached if loyal (non-defective) generals have a majority agreement on their strategy. It is possible to indicate a default voting value for missing messages. For example, missing messages may . If the agreement is that the votes have a majority, a standard strategy pre. B can be used (z.B. withdrawal). [11] Each lieutenant value in a particular exercise will have the same paths for all its knots, and in this case, since only the general is defective, we know that all lieutenants will have the same entry value on all his leaves. As a result, all processes agree on the same value, 1 that fulfills the quality of the agreement.
This situation does not necessarily improve simply by putting more defective processes on the problem. A naïve algorithm, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, could tell any process what it received from P1. A process would then decide fair value by taking a simple majority of values in its incoming messages. The first step of the algorithm is simply one of the data entclosures. The algorithm defines the m-1 message towers between all processes. When sending messages at each turn, processes also accumulate incoming messages. Messages are stored in a tree format, with each new round occupying a structure rank. Figure 3 shows the layout of the structure for a simple configuration with six processes, one of which may be defective. Since m-1, there are only two briefings: the first, where the general sends a value to each lieutenant trial, and a second where each process sends its value to all other processes.
